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MICROHISTORIES OF LONG-DISTANCE
INFORMATION: SPACE, MOVEMENTAND
AGENCY IN THE EARLYMODERN NEWS*
In November 1617, on the eve of the Thirty Years War, the Spanish and
Venetian fleets clashed in the southern Adriatic Sea. Inconclusively fought
at sea and out of view, the battle prompted a flurry of antithetical reports in
manuscript and print. Both sides claimed victory in official announcements,
printed newsbooks and even massive thanksgiving ceremonies. What is more,
contradictory accounts flourished in writing and in rumour inside each camp
and throughout the social scale. In Venice, the news sparked quarrels in a
friary and a tussle in a shop. In the words of a contemporary political observer
and possibly one of the battle’s earliest reporters, information fuelled political
discussion among ‘barbers and the humblest artisans in their workshops’.1
The echo of the battle resonated far, over long geographical distances and
across religious and political boundaries that made even small journeys seem
very extensive; it reached not just Venice, Naples and Spain, but also
Dubrovnik and England, the Ottoman Balkans and Istanbul, and in every
place it reverberated differently. The local mobilized the global and gained
significance from it. Just as mounting hostilities were engulfing the continent
of Europe, many thought that the confrontation played a strategic macro-
regional role extending well beyond the shores of the Adriatic. Meanwhile, a
pamphlet printed in Italy listed the clash alongside other examples of Spanish
prevarication, including atrocities in Mexico — for this purpose the author
excerpted, and then for the first time translated into Italian, Bartolome´ de Las
Casas’ Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies.
Why did the news of a relatively minor skirmish travel so far, and how did it
change so radically along the way? The authorities’ manipulation of military
* This article is dedicated to the memory of Raul Merzario (1946–2005), teacher and
microhistorian. For their numerous comments and suggestions, I am very grateful to
Ilaria Favretto, John-Paul Ghobrial, Carlo Ginzburg, Kat Hill and Mario Infelise; for
specific help, I wish to thank Henry Ettinghausen and Antonio Castillo Gomez. This
article is made open access with funding support from the European Research Council
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme (grant agreement no. 638578).
1 Ludovico Zuccolo, ‘Della ragion di stato’ (1621), in Benedetto Croce and Santino
Caramella, Politici e moralisti del Seicento: Strada, Zuccolo, Settala, Accetto, Brignole
Sale, Malvezzi (Bari, 1930), 25; and see below, 200–207.
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information is hardly surprising, but what role did other people play in its
circulation? Why the tussles? Like trade or migration, information is an es-
sential element of global history, both a means and an effect of contacts
among distant regions and peoples.2 Yet a macro approach struggles to ex-
plain how information worked on the ground. Quantifying the production of
early modern printed periodicals, for example, will trace the long-term
thickening and accelerating of grand flows of distribution, but not who
participated or how they treated information and why. By contrast, micro-
history maximizes the variety of our sources to study how the news travelled
as far as it did, why it came to mutate in the process, thanks to whose agency,
and with what impact. Several microhistories of information are possible, as I
show. In this article I trace how the reports of one event moved across dis-
tances that were vast in geographical and/or cultural terms, in the
Mediterranean and beyond.3 Analysed in microscopic detail, the movement
of information reveals itself as a transformational process compounded of
intensely localized and socially defined activities, by a wide range of people
who shaped the news as they relayed it through places that were at once
specific and connected. Information was both global and local: its circulation
made long distances small, but every small step could make for huge
transformations.
This view adds complexity to our sense of global contacts more generally.
Intense criticism has recently focused on (some) global historians’ tendency
to emphasize, first, the mobility of minorities over the majority’s stability,
and secondly, encounters and exchanges at the expense of conflicts.4 By
locating global movement simultaneously over long distances and in specific
places, we remind ourselves that the news invited competition as much as
exchange and that the world was becoming at the same time both more
connected and also more ridden with conflict. Information divided people
as much as it brought them together, and flows of resources saw unequal
degrees of participation. Like the other contributors to this collection, I hope
to rethink large-scale, global phenomena by, as John-Paul Ghobrial’s intro-
duction underlines, contextualizing them precisely in small spaces. Recent
works have already established themselves as models of global microhistory,
2 See Sebastian Conrad, What is Global History? (Princeton, 1996), 2, 93, 124–5.
3 Guillaume Calafat’s contribution to this volume, ‘Jurisdictional Pluralism in a Litigious
Sea (1590–1630): Hard Cases, Multi-Sited Trials and Legal Enforcement between North
Africa and Italy’, reminds us that the Mediterranean was punctuated by legal differences
that made neighbouring places culturally very distant from each other.
4 See Jeremy Adelman et al., ‘Discussion: The Futures of Global History’, Journal of Global
History, xiii, 1 (2018), 1–21.
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whether by following individuals who moved across borders,5 or by recon-
structing networks that spanned oceans.6 Global histories of science and
material culture have described the circulation of knowledge and artefacts
as transformative processes combining multiple sites of production and re-
elaboration best captured through a micro-approach.7 Just as a ewer that was
probably made in Flanders could then be decorated in Egypt to be sold in Italy
where rich buyers had it further inscribed, so news could be manipulated and
enriched (or impoverished) in successive steps on sometimes circular trajec-
tories.8 In proposing a microhistory of long-distance information I bear all
these models in mind to focus on both individuals and authorities, while also
investigating their own more or less extensive networks of other informers,
and the use they all made of a variety of means for both face-to-face and
impersonal communication. By restricting focus, I increase the variety of my
sources, and in this way I hope to enhance our sense of context and to widen
the framework of historical explanation to include social, political and cul-
tural elements as well as the materiality of information. This breadth of
sources and approaches is what makes microhistory history on the large
scale.9 I concentrate on the case of the news described at the beginning
of this article, but this has broader significance because it can only be
5 For an early example, see Jonathan Spence, The Question of Hu (New York, 1988); Natalie
Zemon Davis, Trickster Travels: A Sixteenth-Century Muslim between Worlds (London,
2007); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Three Ways to Be Alien: Travails and Encounters in the
Early Modern World (Hanover, NH, 2011); John-Paul Ghobrial, ‘The Secret Life of Elias
of Babylon and the Uses of Global Microhistory’, Past and Present, no. 222 (Feb. 2014).
6 Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and
Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven and London, 2009); and
Francesca Trivellato, ‘Is There a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global
History?’ California Italian Studies, ii (2011).
7 See Sarah Easterby-Smith’s contribution to this volume, ‘Recalcitrant Seeds: Material
Culture and the Global History of Science’; and more generally Paula Findlen and Pamela
H. Smith (eds.), Merchants and Marvels: Commerce, Science and Art in Early Modern
Europe (New York, 2002); Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the
Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900 (Basingstoke, 2007);
Simon Schaffer et al. (eds.), The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence,
1770–1820 (Sagamore Beach, Mass., 2009). On the history of material culture, see Anne
Gerritsen and Giorgio Riello (eds.), The Global Lives of Things: The Material Culture of
Connections in the Early Modern World (London, 2016).
8 Marta Ajmar-Wollheim and Flora Dennis (eds.), At Home in Renaissance Italy (London,
2006), 310.
9 Filippo de Vivo, ‘Prospect or Refuge? Microhistory, History on the Large Scale’, Cultural
and Social History, vii (2010).
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understood by reference to the wider forces at play, from economic compe-
tition to religious differences to structural inequalities, and because in turn, it
throws new light on the prevailing forms of information exchange and so on
information history more generally. The point of Jacques Revel’s call for
combining different scales of analysis is not to populate macro-historical
models, but to rethink general explanations through specific cases.10 I
come back to the significance of my case in section III below, but I want to
stress that, methodologically, there is no contradiction between microhistory
and the study of cases, unless one sees cases as merely examinations of general
theories in particular contexts.11 Surely cases may be used not just to verify,
but also to correct general interpretations and, if necessary, to propose new
ones.
I
Over the last generation, some of our time’s most momentous concerns have
transformed the historical study of information in two seemingly opposite
directions: the communicational practices that spread the news across spe-
cifically located societies; and the media that increasingly enabled it to travel
over long distances and across continents. On the one hand, influenced by
our own digital revolution, many historians have responded to Robert
Darnton’s call of twenty-five years ago, to move from the history of the
book to the history of communication.12 They have identified the defining
feature of early modern news not in the new technology of print, but in the
interaction of print with other modes of communication: scribal, visual and
oral, including songs and objects.13 And they have sought to contextualize
10 As well as the classic Jacques Revel (ed.), Jeux d’e´chelles: La micro-analyse a` l’expe´rience
(Paris, 1996), I recommend Jean-Claude Passeron and Jacques Revel (eds.), Penser par cas
(Paris, 2005); see also Antonella Romano and Silvia Sebastiani, ‘Tentare la storia: spazi e
scale di un’esperienza’; and Francesca Trivellato, ‘Microstoria/Microhistoire/
Microhistory’, both in Antonella Romano and Silvia Sebastiani (eds.), La forza delle
incertezze: Dialoghi storiografici con Jacques Revel (Bologna, 2016).
11 As Jan de Vries does in his contribution to this volume: Jan de Vries, ‘Playing with Scales:
The Global and the Micro, the Macro and the Nano’.
12 Robert Darnton, ‘ ‘‘La France, ton cafe´ fout le camp!’’ De l’histoire du livre a` l’histoire de
la communication’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, c (1993); and Robert
Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Revolutionary France (London, 1996), 169–80.
13 See on manuscript, Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England
(Oxford, 1993); on orality, Thomas V. Cohen and Lesley K. Twomey (eds.), Spoken
Word and Social Practice: Orality in Europe (1400–1700) (Leiden and Boston, 2015);
on singing, Massimo Rospocher and Rosa Salzberg, ‘Street Singers in Italian
Renaissance Urban Culture and Communication’, Cultural and Social History, ix
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information to understand the diverse human activities through which
people received, processed and experienced the news across specifically
located societies.14 In this approach, passive access to the media is less im-
portant than communication as a meaningful form of human intelligence
and action. Whatever one thinks of Habermas’s model of the public sphere, it
is undeniable that the events of 1989 drew huge attention to his emphasis on
the political potential of communication.15
On the other hand, the global turn in history has given new prominence to
the old study of communications in the plural as studied by Marshall
McLuhan and especially Harold Innis.16 Between 1400 and 1800 old and
new means increasingly facilitated the long-distance transportation of mes-
sages: merchant letters circulated along expanding trade routes;17 diplomatic
correspondence grew in regularity with the establishment of stable
(2012), 9–26; on objects, Stefan Hanss, Die materielle Kultur der Seeschlacht von Lepanto
(1571): Materialita¨t, Medialita¨t und die historische Produktion eines Ereignisses
(Wu¨rzburg, 2017); for a synoptic approach to genres, see Barbara J. Shapiro, Political
Communication and Political Culture in England, 1558–1688 (Stanford, 2012).
14 Antonio Castillo Go´mez, Escrituras y Escribientes: Pra´cticas de la cultura escrita en una
ciudad del Renacimiento (Alcala` de Henares) (Las Palmas, 1997); Robert Darnton, ‘An
Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris’, American
Historical Review, cv (2000); Pierangelo Bellettini, Rosaria Campioni and Zita Zanardi
(eds.), Una citta` in piazza: Comunicazione e vita quotidiana a Bologna tra Cinque e
Seicento (Bologna, 2000); Filippo de Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice:
Rethinking Early Modern Politics (Oxford, 2007).
15 Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, 1989); for a critical historical overview, see
Massimo Rospocher (ed.), Beyond the Public Sphere: Opinions, Publics, Spaces in Early
Modern Europe (Bologna and Berlin, 2012). For different approaches, see Andreas
Gestrich, Absolutismus und O¨ffentlichkeit: Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland zu
Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts (Go¨ttingen, 1994); Rudolf Schlo¨gl (ed.), Interaktion und
Herrschaft: Die Politik der fru¨hneuzeitlichen Stadt (Konstanz, 2004).
16 Harold A. Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto, 1950); Marshall McLuhan,
Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (London, 1962); Manuel Castells,
The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1996–8).
17 Pierre Jeannin, ‘La diffusion de l’information’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi (ed.), Fiere e
mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, secc. XIII–XVIII (Florence, 2001); Georg
Christ, ‘A Newsletter in 1419? Antonio Morosini’s Chronicle in the Light of Commercial
Correspondence between Venice and Alexandria’, Mediterranean Historical Review, xx
(2005); Silvia Marzagalli, ‘La circulation de l’information, re´ve´lateur des modalite´s
de fonctionnement propres aux re´seaux commerciaux d’Ancien Re´gime’, Rives nord-
me´diterrane´ennes, xxvii (2007).
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embassies;18 professionals began writing regular manuscript newsletters for
fee-paying elites throughout Europe;19 and in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the periodical press sold at diminishing prices for widening pub-
lics.20 Global empires, trading companies and missionary orders attracted
and redirected information from and to distant parts of the world.21
Meanwhile a series of infrastructural improvements in the organization of
postal relays increased the speed and reliability of the transportation of letters
and newsletters.22 Such developments made news-readers aware of global
18 Johann Petitjean, L’Intelligence des choses: une histoire de l’information entre Italie et
Me´diterrane´e (XVI e–XVII e sie`cles) (Rome, 2013); Isabella Lazzarini, Communication
and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350–1520 (Oxford, 2015);
Filippo de Vivo, ‘Archival Intelligence: Diplomatic Correspondence, Information
Overload, and Information Management in Italy, 1450–1650’, in Liesbeth Corens,
Kate Peters and Alexandra Walsham (eds.), Archives and Information in the Early
Modern World (Proceedings of the British Academy, ccii, Oxford, 2018).
19 Franc¸ois Moureau, Re´pertoire des nouvelles a` la main: Dictionnaire de la presse manuscrite
clandestine XVIII e sie`cle (Paris and Oxford, 1999); Mario Infelise, Prima dei giornali: Alle
origini della pubblica informazione (secoli XVI e XVII) (Bari, 2002); Zsuzsa Barbarics and
Renate Pieper, ‘Handwritten Newsletters as a Means of Communication in Early Modern
Europe’, in Francisco Bethencourt and Florike Egmond (eds.), Correspondence and
Cultural Exchange in Europe 1400–1700 (Cambridge, 2007); Paola Molino, ‘Connected
News: German Zeitungen and Italian Avvisi in the Fugger Collection (1568–1604)’, Media
History, xxii (2016).
20 Interesting transnational cases in John J. McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings
of Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate
Currents and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam, 1991); and Marion
Bre´te´che´, Les compagnons de Mercure: journalisme et politique dans l’Europe de Louis XIV
(Ceyze´rieu, 2015).
21 Michiel van Groesen, Amsterdam’s Atlantic: Print Culture and the Making of Dutch Brazil
(Philadelphia, 2016); Adrien Delmas, Les Voyages de l’e´crit: culture e´crite et expansion
europe´enne a` l’e´poque moderne: essais sur la Compagnie Hollandaise des Indes Orientales
(Paris, 2013). For a different take: Arndt Brendecke, The Empirical Empire: Spanish
Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge (Berlin, 2016); and Cornel Zwierlein,
Imperial Unknowns: The French and British in the Mediterranean, 1650–1750
(Cambridge, 2016). On missionary orders: Markus Friedrich, Der lange Arm Roms?
Globale Verwaltung und Kommunikation im Jesuitenorden, 1540–1773 (Frankfurt,
2011). For earlier periods, see the comments by Hilde De Weerdt, Catherine Holmes
and John Watts, ‘Politics, c.1000–1500: Mediation and Communication’, in the last
supplement of Past and Present, Catherine Holmes and Naomi Standen (eds.), The
Global Middle Ages (Past and Present Supplement no. 13, Oxford, 2018), 238, 13.
22 Wolfgang Behringer, Im Zeichen Des Merkur: Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution
in der Fru¨hen Neuzeit (Go¨ttingen, 2003). A parallel history could be written for the
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connectedness and, in the words of a recent synthesis, helped the world come
to know about itself.23
These historiographical transformations imply different geographical
choices. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, historians studied
the national press or postal system, often in a competitive mood to assess
which state had these first.24 Against this approach, historians of communi-
cation have restricted their focus to gain informational complexity and social
depth: through archival excavations, they assess the ability of information less
to cover countries than to pervade richly reconstructed places, cities or even
squares. This is no trumpeting of local achievements. Teachings drawn from
case studies produced models for comparison, as with Darnton’s influential
communication circuit.25 In turn, even before the calls for decentring
European history, the attention to communicational variety drew from the
anthropology of societies where literacy was not prevalent.26 Nevertheless,
many of these studies have tended to neglect the long-distance movement of
news: not to ignore it, but to take it for granted. By contrast, the turn to the
global prompts us to look beyond places or even nations, to news moving over
long distances and across empires, seas or continents.
This is an exciting challenge — and one which calls for a microhistorical
approach. This may seem paradoxical.27 Of course we could study long-
distance information media on a macro-scale, because printed gazettes and
newspapers lend themselves to the digital collection of large amounts of data
Ottoman empire: see Colin Heywood, ‘The Ottoman Menzilhane and Ulak System in
Rumeli in the Eighteenth Century’, in Writing Ottoman History: Documents and
Interpretations (Aldershot, 2002).
23 Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know About Itself (New
Haven and London, 2014); Brendan Dooley, The Dissemination of News and the
Emergence of Contemporaneity in Early Modern Europe (Farnham and Burlington, 2010).
24 Joad Raymond, ‘The History of Newspapers and the History of Journalism: Two
Disciplines or One?’, Media History, v (1999), 223–32; and for Italy, Infelise, Prima dei
giornali, vi–vii; for communications, see Behringer, ‘Introduction: Communication in
Historiography’, German History, xxiv (2006).
25 Robert Darnton, ‘What Is the History of Books?’, Daedalus, cxi (1982), 65–83.
26 The influence of Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge, 1977)
was particularly prominent with medieval historians such as Armando Petrucci and
Michael Clanchy; see Pierre Chastang, ‘L’Arche´ologie du texte me´die´val: autour de
travaux re´cents sur l’e´crit au Moyen Age’, Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales, lxiii (2008).
27 Which is why there are hesitations and disagreements in Joad Raymond and Noah
Moxham (eds.), News Networks in Early Modern Europe (Leiden and Boston, 2016), 5,
12, 152–3, 512 ff.
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over long periods.28 Ideally, quantifying headings, size, dates and so on,
makes it possible to compare the capacity of different centres for attracting
or disseminating news, and to assess shifts in the speed and regularity of
periodicals. But this approach entails two blindspots. One is geographical,
because the existence of large bodies of printed periodicals tends to privilege
some areas over others. In Andrew Pettegree’s recent synthesis — admirably
including the oral reception of news, but essentially viewing the rise of the
press as a marker of modernity in line with German Pressegeschichte — the
‘world’ that came to know about itself is reduced to western and increasingly
north-western Europe.29 Others have gone as far as stating that mastery of
information technologies is a reason for the rise of the West, thus essentially
substituting the nationalism of old information histories with ethnocentric
modernization theory.30 We should heed Lara Putnam’s warning about the
flattening effect of massive data searches, which privilege English-language
sources and gloss over geo-social and linguistic differences.31 In some coun-
tries, regular newsletters were mostly manuscript, in others entire series of
printed periodicals are attested by only one preserved exemplar.32 The other
blindspot is social. The history of the media investigates technologies crossing
vast spaces, but leaves little room for the people who participated in the
exchange at either end and along the way, not to mention those who did
not. Insofar as they do consider actors, historians of the media tend to focus
on producers, whether news-writers or publishers — once again recalling the
28 An excellent recent work applies quantitative analysis to data gathered from the Fugger
collection of 16,000 newsletters, 1568–1604: Katrin Keller and Paola Molino, Die
Fuggerzeitungen im Kontext: Zeitungssammlungen im Alten Reich und in Italien (Wien,
2015).
29 Pettegree, Invention of News; for a critical discussion of Pressegeschichte, see Keller and
Molino, Die Fuggerzeitungen im Kontext, ch. 1.
30 Jeremy Black, The Power of Knowledge: How Information and Technology Made the
Modern World (New Haven and London, 2014).
31 Lara Putnam, ‘The Transnational and the Text-Searchable: Digitized Sources and the
Shadows They Cast’, American Historical Review, cxxi (2016) — this is particularly det-
rimental for cultures that remained largely manuscript into the nineteenth century, such
as Arabic; see Ghobrial’s point in the introduction to this volume, ‘Seeing the World like a
Microhistorian’, 7. For very interesting methodological considerations on digital re-
search, see Julia Laite, ‘The Emmet’s Inch: Small History in a Digital Age’, Journal of
Social History (forthcoming 2020),5https://doi.org/10.1093/jsh/shy1184 (accessed 10
July 2019).
32 Carmen Espejo and Francisco Baena, ‘A Critique of Periodicity in Early Modern
Journalism: The First Spanish Serial Gazette. Gazeta de Roma in Valencia (1618–
1620), European Review, xxiii (2015).
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traditional history of information as proto-journalism. Instead, they merely
assume diffusion and reception. But needless to say, we can only write a
history of information as truly an element of global knowledge if we consider
the people who read or heard about the news.
Microhistory enables us to limit these blindspots and combine the two
approaches of the study of local communication practices and long-distance
media. One approach, which I adopt in this article, is to follow the movement
of news concerning a specific event, to uncover a variety of means of infor-
mation and a variety of experiences; and to understand both the circulation of
ideas and the material medium and physical contact that enabled it. Others
have done the same before.33 Although they have not all elaborated on the
microhistorical approach involved, the method recalls the exercise indicated
in a foundational piece by Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni, namely to follow
a name through archives.34 Other experiments are possible to reconcile the
local and global, for example to study the functions of particular urban spaces
as ‘resonating boxes’ for information originating from far away;35 the net-
works of well-connected individuals or groups drawing information from
relatives, partners or agents;36 or the activities of single collectors of both local
and distant news.37 In all these cases, the reduction in focus makes it possible
33 Hans Medick, ‘Historical Event and Contemporary Experience: The Capture and
Destruction of Magdeburg in 1631’, History Workshop Journal, lii (2001); Margaret
Meserve, ‘News from Negroponte: Politics, Popular Opinion and Information
Exchange in the First Decade of the Italian Press’, Renaissance Quarterly, lix (2006);
other examples below, 208–209. Sonja Shultheiss-Heinz, ‘Contemporaneity in 1672–
1679: The Paris Gazette, the London Gazette and the Teutsche Kriegs-Kurier’, in
Dooley, The Dissemination of News and the Emergence of Contemporaneity.
34 Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni, ‘Il nome e il come: scambio ineguale e mercato storio-
grafico’, Quaderni storici, xl (1979).
35 De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, 6; and Daniel Bellingradt, ‘The Early
Modern City as a Resonating Box: Media, the Public Sphere and the Urban Space of the
Holy Roman Empire, Cologne and Hamburg c.1700’, Journal of Early Modern History, xvi
(2012).
36 Paul Arblaster, Antwerp and the World: Richard Verstegan and the International Culture of
Catholic Reformation (Leuven, 2004); John-Paul Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities:
Information Flows in Istanbul, London and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull
(Oxford, 2013); Peter N. Miller, Peiresc’s Mediterranean World (Cambridge, Mass.,
2015).
37 Brendan Dooley, Morandi’s Last Prophecy and the End of Renaissance Politics (Princeton,
2002); Matthew Lundin, Paper Memory: A Sixteenth-Century Townsman Writes His
World (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Tom Hamilton, Pierre de L’Estoile and His World in
the Wars of Religion (Oxford, 2017).
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to capture both local and long-distance exchanges, the transmission as well
as the manipulation of messages, and the human as much as the
technological element.
Microhistory entails specific advantages for the history of information.
Two of these stem from the close engagement with a wide variety, not just
a great number, of sources — a point emphasized by Giovanni Levi in his
contribution to this collection. Instead of extensively gathering homogeneous
data from the media alone, restricting our focus enables us to read newsletters
and gazettes against other sources and to cross-examine different archives. A
history of the media based on internal evidence alone tells us nothing about
the motives of news-writers or publishers, whom media historians presup-
pose to be free actors attempting to maximize profit in a competitive market.
But by considering personal or judicial sources, we discover that most pro-
fessionals were clients of powerful figures and that, before 1700, many prin-
ters too depended on patronage for survival.38 Multiplying our sources, we
gain a sense of agency in information processes. This does not just add human
flesh to the history of media; it also affects our understanding of content.
Archival evidence may show that an innocent-looking piece of news reported
in one place originated as a planted leak in another. For example, prior to the
1570 invasion of Cyprus, newsletters from Venice informed the Fuggers in
Augsburg that the Ottomans were planning an attack on Spain; the news
derived from intelligence sent by the Venetian ambassador — but in fact
research on Ottoman sources reveals that he was unwittingly repeating de-
liberately misleading information sown by Ottoman double agents.39
Microhistory can reveal bias and show the difference between news and
fake news.
A second advantage of restricting focus relates to the uses of information.
Evidence about these can be gathered for example by more intensely concen-
trating on some collections to study marginalia or the ways in which readers
assembled or organized those collections.40 Or it can be gathered from other
38 De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, 80–5; for a spectacular case of
business failure and dependence on patronage, Ste´phane Haffemayer, L’information
dans la France du XVII e sie`cle: La Gazette de Renaudot de 1647 a` 1663 (Paris, 2002).
39 O¨sterreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 8949, fols. 107r and 107v, 112v accessed online at
5http://fuggerzeitungen.univie.ac.at/faksimiles/1569?page¼24(accessed 18 June 2019).
Emrah Safa Gu¨rkan, ‘Desinformacio´n y rumores en Estambul en el comienzo de la guerra
de Chipre (1569–1570)’, in Gennaro Varriale (ed.), Si fuera cierto? Espı`as y agentes en la
frontera (siglos XVI–XVII) (Alcala` de Henares, 2018).
40 Noah Millstone, ‘Designed for Collection: Early Modern News and the Production of
History’, Media History, xxiii (2017); see also de Vivo, ‘Archival Intelligence’.
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sources, such as descriptions, chronicles, or trial records that tell us about the
people who had access to information and about their reactions. It was by
studying Menocchio’s books against his trial records that Ginzburg set a
milestone in the history of reading as a creative activity.41 In Venice, moles’
reports describe who read newsletters, where, and sometimes what they com-
mented.42 Focusing on a single diary spanning thirty-seven years, an eco-
nomic historian and pioneer historian of information insisted on the
commercial value of news in determining prices and investments.43
Responding to a less impersonal view of the market — a view itself closely
connected to microhistory44 — more recent historians have underlined the
uncertainties of and unequal access to information. As important as the de-
velopment of information technologies was the know-how (both local and
global) of investors who took decisions on the basis not only of rational
calculus but also of personal, social and institutional ties.45
As the last two paragraphs argue, sources enable microhistorians to gain a
richer sense of context and so to nuance understanding of how information
worked in practice. But microhistory does not just gain greater granularity. A
final advantage concerns the conceptualization of historical phenomena
themselves. Just as microhistory was originally inspired to challenge the
stereotypes of modernization theory, so the microhistory of global informa-
tion overcomes the technological determinism of media history.46 A meth-
odological leap typical of microhistory and resulting from its close dialogue
with the social sciences consists in historicizing a category to understand its
41 Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller
(London, 1980).
42 De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, ch. 3.
43 Pierre Sardella, Nouvelles et spe´culations a` Venise au de´buts du XVI e sie`cle (Paris, 1947);
see also Michel Morineau, Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux me´taux: les retours des tre´sors
ame´ricains d’apre`s les gazettes hollandaises (Cambridge and Paris, 1984).
44 Giovanni Levi, Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist (Chicago, 1988). In Centro e
periferia di uno stato assoluto: Tre saggi su Piemonte e Liguria in eta` moderna (Turin, 1985),
Levi underlined the role of unequal information as well as personal circumstances in
determining early modern landed investments.
45 Wolfgang Kaiser and Biagio Salvemini (eds.), ‘Informazioni e scelte economiche’, special
issue of Quaderni storici, cxxiv (2007); Anne L. Murphy, The Origins of English Financial
Markets: Investment and Speculation before the South Sea Bubble (Cambridge, 2009);
Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 153–93.
46 Giovanni Levi, ‘On Microhistory’, in Peter Burke (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical
Writing (Cambridge, 1991); Carlo Ginzburg, ‘Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I
Know About It’, Critical Inquiry, xx (1993); Maurizio Gribaudi, ‘E´chelle, pertinence,
configuration’, in Revel (ed.), Jeux d’e´chelles.
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construction as resulting from social processes that themselves require
analysis — as with Simona Cerutti’s work on citizenship, for example.47
When it comes to information, media histories essentially adopt a diffusionist
model to understand the news as prepackaged goods, distributed in linear
processes with varying speed and quantity but without changing. By privileging
the ability of technologies to fix messages for quick transmission, media his-
torians have thus shifted away from Braudel’s ‘tyranny of distance’, to the
‘demise of distance’, in line with a vision of modernity dominated by the
acceleration of time and the compression of space.48 But we need to ask how
movement affected information, ideas, knowledge: what distance did. As I hope
to demonstrate in the second part of this article, microhistory highlights
variations, accretions and manipulations, to understand information
as unstable and as constructed in the process of moving. This in turn
allows us to understand space less as an obstacle to overcome than as itself a
transformative factor.
II
Different scales must be combined. Before turning to the microhistory of the
news of the 1617 Adriatic battle from which we started, we need to consider its
broader, or macro, context, extending to the Mediterranean and Europe and
reaching back in the medium and long terms. Claimed by Venice as a sover-
eign dominion, the ‘gulf of Venice’ — as it was labelled in most contemporary
maps (see Plates 1 and 2) — was for centuries both an unstable frontier and a
channel for exchange. In the sixteenth century competition grew, with direct
trade between papal Ancona and Ragusa, but in the 1590s Venice established a
free port at Split welcoming Muslims, Jews and Christians. The project, sup-
ported by the Ottomans and proposed by Portuguese-born Jewish merchant
Daniel Rodriga, was sustained by a global vision for reviving east–west trade
47 Jacques Revel, ‘Microanalyse et construction du social’, in Revel (ed.), Jeux d’e´chelles; and
see also Simona Cerutti, Giustizia sommaria: Pratiche e ideali di giustizia in una societa` di
Ancien Re´gime (Torino, XVIII Secolo) (Milan, 2003). As these publications show, De
Vries’s idea of an ‘animus’ in microhistory against ‘social science history and especially
economic history’ is based on a selective view of microhistory, De Vries, ‘Playing with
Scales’; see also Trivellato, ‘Microstoria/Microhistoire/Microhistory’, in Romano and
Sebastiani (eds.), La forza delle incertezze.
48 John J. McCusker, ‘The Demise of Distance: The Business Press and the Origins of the
Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World’, American Historical
Review, cx (2005); see Judy Wajcman, Pressed for Time: The Acceleration of Life in
Digital Capitalism (Chicago, 2015).
190 PAST AND PRESENT SUPPLEMENT 14
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/242/Supplem
ent_14/179/5637705 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 08 January 2020
against growing Atlantic routes.49 But regional difficulties undermined it. While
Venice was committed to protecting navigation, the threat of piracy persisted.
The Uskoks, a refugee population who had fled Ottoman advance and now
guarded some of the disputed borderland between Habsburgs and Ottomans,
raided both Muslim and Christian convoys from their coastal fortresses in
modern-day Croatia.50 In 1615–17, partly with Dutch ships and men arriving
via the Adriatic, Venice opened war on the Uskoks’ overlord, the archduke of
Inner Austria, who as Emperor Ferdinand II would soon become a driving
force in the Thirty Years War.51 His Spanish cousin, the king of Spain, did
not enter into formal hostilities with Venice, but the duke of Osuna, bellicose
Spanish viceroy of Naples and a prominent member of Madrid’s war faction,
repeatedly attacked Venetian galleys, partly with Ragusan intelligence.52 In
1617–18 this growing entanglement risked having serious geopolitical conse-
quences. Had the Spanish secured control of the Adriatic, they could have
turned it into a corridor to central Europe, a strategic alternative to the route
that cut across the Alps — and this just as general war was about to break out.53
Unsurprisingly, the authorities on all sides attached huge importance to the
event. But so too did very many other people.
Spin, secrecy and publicity
On 19 November 1617, after months of mounting hostilities, the Venetian
fleet surprised a smaller Spanish squadron by the bay of Santa Croce in
southern Dalmatia. Heavy cannon fire broke out, but no on-board attack
followed and, despite numerical inferiority, the Spanish managed to escape
and reach their port in Apulia.54 The encounter was undignified for both
49 Renzo Paci, La ‘Scala’ di Spalato e il commercio veneziano nei Balcani fra Cinque e Seicento
(Venice, 1971).
50 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice (London, 1967); Catherine W.
Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century
Adriatic (Ithaca and London, 1992).
51 Paolo Sarpi, La Repubblica di Venezia, la casa d’Austria e gli Uscocchi, ed. Gaetano and
Luisa Cozzi (Bari, 1965).
52 Luis M. Linde, Don Pedro Giro´n, duque de Osuna: La hegemonı´a espan˜ola en Europa a
comienzos del siglo XVII (Madrid, 2005).
53 Osuna repeatedly tried to ship troops to Triest: Hans von Zwiedineck-Su¨denhorst, Die
Politik der Republik Venedig wa¨hrend der dreissigja¨hrigen Krieges, vol. i (Stuttgart, 1882),
41–7; A. B. Hinds (ed.), Calendar of State Papers . . . Venice, vol. xv (London, 1909), 433,
447, 551.
54 Cesareo Ferna´ndez Duro, El gran duque de Osuna y su marina: Jornadas contra turcos y
venecianos (1602–1624) (Madrid, 1885), 100–8; Mario Nani Mocenigo, Storia della
marina veneziana da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica (Rome, 1935), 97–112.
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sides, which is no doubt one of the reasons why both soon tried to turn it into
a triumph. Close observation shows that even the protagonists diverged in
interpretation and detail, so as to inflate their merit or deflect responsibility.
For this reason they sent reports as swiftly as possible. On 21 November, the
Spanish commander Francisco de Ribera wrote to the viceroy in Naples about
his buen succeso, a carefully chosen expression that avoided falsely claiming
victory. With only fifteen vessels against fifty-nine, and despite unfavourable
wind, he had suffered only a dozen casualties and forced the enemy to flee
‘with shame’.55 The Venetian admiral Lorenzo Venier sent a message as soon
as he sighted the Spanish fleet, but after the battle had to wait for the passing of
a storm before following up with more news — adverse weather at this time of
year in fact meant that his first dispatch only reached Venice after his
second.56 On 23 November he managed to anchor at Palagruzˇa, a rock
midway between Dalmatia and Puglia, and dispatched another boat to
Venice to inform the Senate that he had repelled the Spanish out of the
‘Gulf’. But he also revealed details that would never make it into public re-
ports. Just as his fleet manoeuvred into a crescent for the final blow, many
officers failed to obey his order to attack. With unusual strength, he
denounced his fellow patricians: ‘the fault is mine, for failing to understand
that I commanded men of no heart’.57 Four days later, having reached a
Venetian port with regular connections across the sea, he discovered and
reported worse news: after the battle, five of his galleys sank in the storm.58
Those who received the reports manipulated them before passing them on:
speed mattered less than the possibility for spin — and in this process, dis-
tance was less a problem than an opportunity. Proximity gave the Spanish the
advantage, but Osuna waited several days before reporting to Philip III in
Madrid, possibly waiting for better news. He then inflated the number of
Venetian vessels by a third, omitted all Spanish casualties, and unambigu-
ously affirmed that Ribera was now sen˜or of the Adriatic. He also announced
that a storm had sunk eleven Venetian galleys, rather than Venier’s alleged
55 Ribera to Osuna, 21 Nov. 1617, in Marque`s de Pidal, Marque`s de Miraflores and Miguel
Salva´ (eds.), Coleccion de documentos ine´ditos para la historia de Espana (hereafter
CODOIN), xlvi (Madrid, 1865), 203–4.
56 Archivio di Stato di Venezia (hereafter ASV), Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Dalmazia, file 17,
copy forwarded on 22 Nov. 1617, received in Venice on 4 Dec. 1617.
57 ASV, Senato, Dispacci dei provveditori di terra e da mar, file 926, Dispatch from Palagruzˇa
of 23 Nov. 1617, partially published in Mocenigo, Storia della marina veneziana, 126–9.
58 ASV, Senato, Dispacci dei provveditori di terra e da mar, file 926, Dispatch from Curzola/
Korc¸ula of 27 Nov. 1617.
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five.59 Osuna had his reasons for twisting an indecisive encounter into vic-
tory, because he and his faction were fighting their own battle at court for
aggressive foreign policy against the appeasement preferred by Spain’s first
minister, the duke of Lerma. Thus fake news first arose not out of self-delu-
sion but for reasons linked with disagreement over the political strategies of
far-flung empires.
In Venice, Venier’s letter was slow to arrive, but the Senate relayed the news
immediately, wishing to counter unfavourable accounts that were already
circulating. Crucially, its communications diverged depending on the ad-
dressee. To ambassadors abroad, the Senate denounced Spanish treachery
at a time when Lerma was mediating peace between Venice and the Austrians,
and it announced Venier’s victory as a sign of Venice’s Adriatic sovereignty.
But writing to coastal governors and naval commanders, the Senate gave
more realistic instructions to prepare for renewed enemy attacks.60
Meanwhile at home the government opened an enquiry into the officers’
insubordination, but concealed this from larger patrician assemblies, possibly
to prevent internal rifts from escalating.61 And while hesitating between
warning and reassuring its own officers, the government immediately
opted for secrecy when it came to the larger public. On hearing about the
battle, the governor of Spalato informed ‘militias, towndwellers and villagers’
to prepare to defend themselves; but from Venice the Collegio, a smaller and
more reserved assembly than the Senate, secretly instructed him in future to
keep such news to himself and especially to avoid alarming merchants.62
Things changed when the authorities on both sides embarked on commu-
nication activities that exploited the urban space to target a range of publics.
In Naples, the viceroy addressed in person the representatives of merchants
and professionals, announcing that he had destroyed the Venetian navy and
spelling out the local implications: Venice could no longer exact customs
duties in the Adriatic.63 This was part of a long-term strategy since he
59 Osuna to Philip III, 30 Nov. 1617, in Pidal, Miraflores and Salva´ (eds.), CODOIN, xlvi
(Madrid, 1865), 203–7; Osuna received Ribera’s letter on 25 Nov.: Francisco Quevedo,
Epistolario completo, ed. L. Astrana (Madrid, 1946), 77. On other skilful exploitations of
postal tardiness, see Pidal, Miraflores and Salva´ (eds.), CODOIN, xlvi (Madrid, 1865),
569.
60 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni segrete, reg. 111, fos. 13 and 24–5, Dispatches of 6 Dec. and 8
Dec. 1617.
61 Ibid., fol. 14v.
62 ASV, Senato, Rettori, Dispacci, Dalmazia, file 17, 20 Nov. 1617; and ASV, Collegio, Lettere
segrete, file 49, 9 Dec. 1617.
63 ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Residenti, Napoli, file 34, 4 Dec. 1617.
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regularly appealed to the popolo against the hostility of the aristocracy.64 He
also ordered special thanksgiving ceremonies for the feast of the Immaculate
Conception on 8 December, in the Jesuit church and the monastery of San
Lorenzo — a religious site with official civic functions where the popolo met and
where he had been acclaimed upon his arrival a year earlier.65 A sermon by the
viceroy’s chaplain, printed the following day, made no reference to the battle
but adopted a military tone, appropriate to a church he described as ‘full of
brave soldiers . . . with their feathers, strong lances and swords’; he elaborated
on the Virgin’s battle against the devil, and celebrated the king of Spain as
monarcha del Mundo.66 The occasion is particularly intriguing, since Osuna
ordered officers, nobles and university professors to attend and swear their
belief in the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, which in those years the
Spanish wanted the pope to define as dogma.67 One could say that Osuna
wanted the congregation to believe in similarly unquestioning terms in his
recent victory. A procession reinforced the message by marching to the
Castel Nuovo, with its massive towers and the Aragonese arch celebrating
earlier triumphs, flanked on either side by military companies. More parades
and fireworks were staged outside the viceroyal palace, including a sumptuous
apparatus of ephemeral arches hailing Osuna as champion of the faith, conflat-
ing infidel and Venetian foes. The celebration involved a notable display of sea
power since the palace faced onto the arsenal, where Osuna ordered the con-
struction of more ships.
Meanwhile, the Venetian Senate too abandoned secrecy for official com-
munication, both in the capital and in the territories. Governors told the
representatives of local communities that the enemy had been defeated,
and that the Republic would protect the safety of its subjects, their goods
and their honour.68 Such generic language was given substance when the
64 On Osuna’s problems with the seggi, see Rosario Villari, Un sogno di liberta`: Napoli nel
declino di un impero, 1585–1648 (Milan, 2012), 89–127.
65 ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Residenti, Napoli, file 34, Dispatch of 12 Dec. 1617; also in
Encarnacio´n Sa´nchez Garcı´a, Imprenta y cultura en la Na´poles virreinal: los signos de la
presencia espan˜ola (Florence, 2007), 119–21. On San Lorenzo, see Giulio Cesare
Capaccio, Il forastiero (Naples, 1634), 186, 412, 661, 905–6. I am grateful to Melissa
Calaresu for her advice on this point.
66 Pedro Miraval Ayllon, Sermon predicado . . . en la solennissima fiesta que el . . . sen˜or don
Pedro Giron duque de Ossuna virrey de Napoles . . . hizo a la Inmaculada Conception de la
Virgen . . . en la casa profesa de la Compania de Iesus (Naples, 1617).
67 Domenico Antonio Parrino, Teatro eroico e politico (Naples, 1770), i, 336–7; and see also
Gabriel Guarino, Representing the King’s Splendour: Communication and Reception of
Symbolic Forms of Power in Viceregal Naples (Manchester, 2010), 80.
68 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni segrete, reg. 111, fos. 52v–53v, 19 Dec. 1617.
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Board of Trade convened merchants in Rialto to reassure them that the
navy was patrolling the sea and to promise special escorts all the way to
Corfu.69 The governor of Spalato similarly pledged escorts north to mer-
chants coming overland from Istanbul.70 Again, announcements were fol-
lowed by public ceremonies, when the Senate ordered a procession to the
arsenal for the launch of two large galleons. Such a display of naval strength
was meant for local audiences, but also to inspire reports destined abroad; a
favourable news-writer commented that Venice now had a greater fleet than at
the time of Lepanto.71 In both Naples and Venice, then, the authorities tried to
impose their version of the events, avoided negative details, amplified positive
ones and simplified accounts to increase their effectiveness. Declarations and
ceremonies inscribed the news into opposite imperial projects — Venice’s
sovereignty over the Adriatic as a safe corridor for trade versus Spain’s leader-
ship of Catholic Europe under the guidance of the Virgin Mary.
Agents and means of information
Official declarations and ceremonies were less top-down propaganda than
responses to information that circulated outside the authorities’ control. A
range of semi-official figures with an interest in the news had a remarkable
ability to mediate it across borders. In Naples, the Ragusan merchant Giorgio/
Jorge Dolisti worked as an agent of the grand duke of Tuscany, furnished
ships to Osuna and belonged to a broader network of fellow-Ragusans help-
ing the Spanish.72 In meetings with the viceroy and in letters to Philip III’s
secretary in Madrid, he described the battle as a resounding victory, inflated
Venetian losses and claimed merit for pointing the Spanish to the best spot on
the coast.73 As the Venetians complained repeatedly in this period, the
Ragusans were spies of the Spanish.74 But they too had their informers in
Spanish territories, and across the social scale. One, in the port of Brindisi,
69 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni segrete, reg. 111, fo. 77, 5 Jan. 1618.
70 ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Dalmazia, file 17, 12 Dec. 1617.
71 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome (hereafter BAV), MS Urb. Lat. 1085, fo. 507v,
Venice avvisi of 23 Dec. 1617; and MS Urb. Lat. 1086, fo. 23v, Venice avvisi of 20 Jan.
1618; ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, box 704, file 4, 6 Jan. 1618.
72 Ferna´ndez Duro, El gran duque, 233–4, and a selection of his letters to the grand duke in
Francesco Palermo (ed.), Narrazioni e documenti sulla storia del regno di Napoli dall’anno
1522 al 1667 (Florence, 1846). On Ragusan intelligence networks see Petitjean,
L’Intelligence des choses, 311–79.
73 14 Dec. 1617, in Pidal, Miraflores and Salva´ (eds.), CODOIN, xlvi (Madrid, 1865), 231–2;
and ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Residenti, Napoli, file 34, Dispatches of 28 Nov. and 1 Dec.
1617.
74 ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Dalmazia, file 17, 5 Dec. 1617 (governor of Kotor).
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wrote that Spanish casualties amounted to three hundred and, to corroborate
his report, turned to his own expert informant or ‘practitioner’ (prattico): a
shipwright who assured him that heavy damages to rudders, masts and rig-
gings, and holes ‘only two palms above the waterline’ made the fleet unser-
viceable. The Venetian agent in Naples passed on the intelligence as ‘more
than 300 casualties and as many or more wounded’, making the Spanish
defeat ‘obvious’.75 Discrepancies increased as information travelled.
The intelligence of paid informers was compounded by the periodical
newsletters or avvisi produced by professionals for paying subscribers.
They were constantly at odds with each other. The earliest report in Venice
was vague: ‘rumour has it here’ (qui s’e` sparsa voce) that the Venetians had
clashed with eight Spanish galleons and sunk two, ‘with little damage to
ours’.76 A later newsletter reported bolder news from Naples: six Spanish
galleons had been sunk.77 On 6 December, a Roman news-writer reported
news from Bari that a large Spanish fleet had been spotted off the Apulian
coast; three days later he added that the Spanish had beaten the Venetians,
repeating details matching Ribera’s letter to Osuna.78 Another Roman news-
writer affirmed that the storm destroyed almost all the Venetian fleet.79 In the
following days, different news-writers reported wildly contrasting facts about
the timing of the battle, the size of the fleets, the number of vessels sunk and
the casualties. A Venetian news-writer repeated the gist of the Brindisi spy’s
report, though he said he obtained the news from a boat coming from that
city; he toned down the casualties by a third but added that disease had spread
in the port.80 Another added colour when he affirmed that one of the Spanish
galleons was so damaged that it sank while entering the harbour.81 Thus,
news-writers repeated some of the reports they received from abroad and
twisted others, enriching them with news they obtained locally.
Their contradictions encouraged those who could afford it to seek more
authoritative reports known at the time as relazioni or relacio´nes. Longer than
75 ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Residenti, Napoli, file 34, Letters from Brindisi of 29 Nov. and 13
Dec. and enclosing dispatch of 19 Dec. 1617.
76 BAV, MS Urb. Lat. 1085, fo. 477, Venice avviso of 2 Dec. 1617; no mention in the avviso of
2 Dec. 1617 submitted to the Inquisitors of State for approval, ASV, Inquisitori di Stato,
box 704, file 4.
77 BAV, MS Urb. Lat. 1085, fo. 485v, Venice avviso of 9 Dec. 1617.
78 78 BAV, MS Urb. Lat. 1085, fo. 481, Rome avviso of 6 Dec. 1617; and fo. 492, Rome avviso
of 9 Dec. 1617.
79 BAV, MS Urb. Lat. 1085, fo. 482v, Rome avviso of 9 Dec. 1617.
80 BAV, MS Urb. Lat. 1085, fo. 508, Venice avviso of 23 Dec. 1617.
81 ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, box 704, file 4, Undated, but between 9 and 23 Dec. 1617.
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newsletters, they tended to concentrate on specific events and offer broader
analysis. Some were allegedly written by eyewitnesses — the author of one, an
anonymous Ragusan nobleman, claimed he saw everything from his house by
the sea (his report was sold to the duke of Urbino, possibly by a Roman news-
writer).82 Authors now famous for their literary writings fashioned their
image as news experts at the time. At Osuna’s command, Francisco de
Quevedo, then in Madrid as his agent, wrote on Italian affairs pleading for
aggressive Adriatic policy, and later penned (divergent) reports of the
November battle.83 Ludovico Zuccolo, a well-known writer of political and
moral treatises and an active intelligencer then teaching philosophy in
Ragusa, offered a relazione to the duke of Urbino.84 This may coincide with
an anonymous text now in the latter’s collection.85 It claimed impartiality, set
the news in a longer narrative of Venetian–Spanish rivalry, and corrected
some information then circulating to conclude that the Spanish suffered
greater damages, but the battle was humiliating for both sides. Whatever
their opinions, the authors of relazioni must have regarded uncertainty less
as a problem than as an opportunity for advertising their expertise and selling
their services.
The microhistorical approach allows us to see printed texts not in isolation
but as engaged with other forms of communication. The two newsbooks
mentioned above were printed in early 1618, possibly to counter the mount-
ing tide of contrasting reports. Like countless occasionals at the time and
unlike manuscript relazioni, they were meant for a wide public, produced in
large print-runs, in two editions in Venice, and three in Spain.86 They pre-
sented themselves as eyewitness reports — letters by the Spanish commander
82 BAV, Ms. Urb. Lat. 1085, file 488, Report dated 24 Nov. 1617. The Venetian agent in
Naples also obtained an eyewitness report from Ragusa, dated 23 Nov. 1617 and for-
warded it to Venice on 4 Dec. 1617: ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Residenti, Napoli, fo. 34.
83 Francisco Quevedo, Obras completas, ed. A. Fernandez-Guerra and M. Mene´ndez Pelayo,
i (Seville, 1897), 214–16 ; and Pablo Jauralde Pou, Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645)
(Madrid, 1998), 333–95; on the November battle: Francisco Quevedo, Mundo caduco, ed.
J. Biurrun Lizarazu (Pamplona, 2000), 87 and 136; and on these literary milieux in Spain,
see Maria Soledad Arredondo, Literatura y propaganda en tiempo de Quevedo: guerras y
plumas contra Francia, Catalun˜a y Portugal (Madrid, 2011).
84 Bruno Nediani, ‘Dieci lettere inedite di Ludovico Zuccolo ai duchi d’Urbino (1606–
1621)’, Studi romagnoli, viii (1957), 181–6; Zuccolo is the author of the quotation
from which I started on political discussions in artisans’ and barbers’ shops.
85 BAV, Ms. Urb. Lat. 1113, fos. 318–26.
86 Relacio´n de lo que sucedio´ a los galeones del excelentisimo duque de Osuna (Seville, 1618),
also printed in Madrid and Malaga; and Lettera di ragguaglio di qvello che e` svccesso tra le
due armate in mare (n.p., n.d.).
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himself, Ribera, and by one undefined Venetian ‘captain Alfonso’. Both af-
firmed their reliability with rich accounts of life aboard, climate details and
locations at sea, but of course they diverged in both general interpretation and
points of fact. The Spanish newsbook also associated Osuna’s victory over the
Venetians with Christian accomplishments over Muslim pirates in the
Mediterranean. And they differed in presentation: an official letter full with
royal arms and licence to publish in Spain, versus a personal letter in a bare
anonymous pamphlet in Venice, without licence or publication details. In
this as in other public polemics at the time, the Venetians preferred to put
distance between themselves and their texts.87
Even when it ceased to be news, information continued to nourish publi-
cations in a variety of genres. A large publishing centre, Venice produced
many pamphlets in support of Venice’s Adriatic sovereignty, a literature that
is now known especially because of Paolo Sarpi’s contribution.88 One advan-
tage of the microhistorical approach is that it captures others and less known
participants and places. In 1618–19 two large legal treatises mentioned the
news (and referred to the newsbooks) to support opposite claims about the
dominion of the Adriatic: one was published in Salamanca and in Naples; the
other in Lyon in two editions by a professor of law who would soon obtain a
chair in Padua.89 Authors had obvious stakes in reporting the news. For their
part, Neapolitan printers did not lie idle; if anything, in a declining industry
under increasing censorship, they were bound to seek government patron-
age.90 They dedicated encomiastic publications to Osuna, associating his
earlier exploits in Flanders against the Dutch with those against the
Venetians and the Turks now. Some of their pamphlets were then reprinted
in Spain, turning news of Osuna’s victories into arguments in favour of his
faction.91 Nor did the news have only textual ramifications, since it also
87 De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, ch. 6; see Valentina Nider, ‘La
Relacio´n verdadera de Emanuel de Tordesillas y el Mundo caduco de Francisco de
Quevedo’, La Perinola, xviii (2014), 147.
88 De Vivo, ‘Historical Justifications of Venetian Power in the Adriatic’, Journal of the
History of Ideas, lxiv (2003).
89 Valenzuela Velazquez, Consilia seu Iuris responsa (Naples, 1618); and Giulio Pace, De
dominio maris Hadriatici disceptatio (Lyon, 1619).
90 Pasquale Lopez, Inquisizione stampa e censura nel Regno di Napoli tra ’500 e ’600 (Naples,
1974), 199–245; and on publishing under Osuna’s patronage, Sa´nchez Garcı´a, Imprenta y
cultura, 93–114; for an earlier period, see Pietro Manzi, La tipografia napoletana nel ’500, 6
vols. (Florence, 1974).
91 Jauralde Pou, Francisco de Quevedo, 368n; Augustin Redondo, ‘El mundo turco a trave´s
de las relaciones de sucesos’ de finales del siglo XVI y de las primeras de´cadas del siglo
XVII: La percepcio´n de la alteridad y su puesta en obra narrativa’, in A. Paba and G.
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nourished material culture. In the wake of the battle, in circles close to the
viceroyal court, Neapolitan and Flemish craftsmen collaborated to produce a
series of ebony and ivory cabinets richly inlaid with maps of the Adriatic Sea
dotted with ships and surrounded by portraits of kings of Naples and Spain,
visually claiming the sea for the Kingdom of Naples (see Plate 1).92
Finally, some authors parodied the language of the news in print for satir-
ical effect. A genre recently inaugurated by Traiano Boccalini and already
popular in Europe at the time, featured historical and mythical characters
gathering in Parnassus to comment on fictional and real news.93 One, attrib-
uted at the time to Quevedo, described Venice’s ignominious arrival at
Parnassus: abandoned by its allies, threatened by the Austrians, humiliated
by the Spanish, Venice has to seek refuge in a ‘hospital’ — a common po-
lemical construction aimed at highlighting the adversary’s weakness.94
Circulated in manuscript in October, the text attracted three responses in
several printed editions — a typical case of polemical inflation — published
in both Italian and Spanish under various pseudonyms by the same author,
Giacomo Castellani.95 The first begins with the arrival at Parnassus of ragged
Venice and triumphant Spain, but then unmasks the two characters as im-
postors paid by Spain and cites the battle off Santa Croce as evidence of
Spain’s, not Venice’s, defeat.96 The actress impersonating Spain is none
other than Donna Francesca de Quevedo, a prostitute and a witch who
Andre´s Renales (eds.), Encuentro de civilizaciones (1500–1750): Informar, celebrar, narrar
(Alcala` de Henares, 2003), 250.
92 Two similar desks with a very similar map of the Adriatic were produced within a few
years of each other in 1619 and 1621; both are held at the Museum of the Certosa di San
Martino in Naples; another one, similar in design but showing the battle of Lepanto, is in
the Poldi Pezzoli Museum in Milan. For a further discussion of the genre, see Alvaro
Gonza´lez-Palacios, ‘Giovanni Battista De Curtis, Iacobo Fiamengo e lo stipo manierista
napoletano’, Antologia di Belle Arti, vi (1978).
93 Harald Hendrix, Traiano Boccalini fra erudizione e polemica: ricerche sulla fortuna e
bibliografia critica (Florence, 1995).
94 Federica Cappelli, ‘La Repu´blica de Venecia . . . (1617) attribuita a Francisco de Quevedo:
saggio di edizione’, Rivista di filologia e letterature ispaniche, vi (2003). On the polemical
strategy, Noel Malcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War: An
Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 2007).
95 [Giacomo Castellani], Avviso di Parnaso . . . scritto da vn curioso nouellista spagnuolo. Con
alcvne annotationi molto importanti (Antopoli, 1618); Valerio Fulvio [Castellani], Castigo
essemplare de’ calunniatori (Antopoli, 1618); and Michele Pio [Castellani], Allegatione per
confirmare quanto si scrive nell’annotationi dell’Avviso di Parnaso al numero 57 (Antopoli,
1618).
96 [Castellani], Castigo essemplare de’ calunniatori, 11.
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fabricated both news and magical concotions — a humiliating denunciation
of Quevedo’s servile lies, and an indirect attack on Osuna, whose lover had
been implicated in suspicions of witchcraft a year earlier.97 Thus, literary
imagination was coupled with social and sexual stereotypes to twist factual in-
formation into comical stories that pilloried both news specialists and
their masters for the entertainment of readers familiar with the real
world of information.
Places: geographical ramifications
Castellani’s last pamphlet gave the news a surprising global echo when it listed
Osuna’s incursion in the Adriatic alongside other examples of Spanish im-
perial tyranny around the world. To do so he quoted passages on the atrocities
perpetrated against natives in Mexico from Bartolome´ de Las Casas’ Short
Account of the Destruction of the Indies — which he later went on to translate
into Italian for the first time.98 The news had impressive ramifications indeed,
well beyond the opposing parties. Printed gazettes reveal some but are subject
to a staggeringly low chance of survival. None, to my knowledge, are extant
for the early months of 1618, but the earliest Dutch Corantos from later in the
year regularly relayed news from Venice, and the same goes for both earlier
and later German Zeitungen.99 In Frankfurt, a 1618 untitled annual bulletin
collating periodical reports from many locations reported military prepar-
ations in Naples and the arrival of Dutch reinforcements in Venice, but noth-
ing on the battle.100 In Paris, the 1619 Mercure de France, covering the two
previous years, assigned victory to the Venetians who, it said, gunned down
three Spanish ships.101 If we confined ourselves to printed gazettes we would
know very little of the staggering multiplication of news analysed so far. And
we would be blind to the information channels in areas where no gazettes
were printed. This is the case, most notably, in the Ottoman empire, a third
party in the Venetian–Spanish confrontation, but one where interest in the
Adriatic was high. For this we need to turn to other sources.
97Villari, Un sogno di liberta`, 136–7.
98[Castellani], Avviso di Parnaso, 54–6; and Bartolome´ de Las Casas, Istoria o` brevissima
relatione della distruttione dell’Indie Occidentali (Venice, 1626).
99Folke Dahl, Dutch Corantos, 1618–1650: A Bibliography (The Hague, 1946), 1; Johannes
Weber, ‘Strassburg 1605: The Origins of the Newspaper in Europe’, German History, xxiv
(2006). Dahl calculated that the survival rate of English corantos was 0.013 per cent.
100Untitled Zeitung printed in Frankfurt since 1615:5http://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/
zeitungen17/periodical/pageview/9043814(accessed on 18 June 2019).
101Cinquiesme tome du Mercure franc¸ois . . . contenant ce qui s’est passe´ de memorable ez
anne´es 1617, 1618 et 1619 (Paris, 1619), 217.
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Diplomatic dispatches and petitions show that Ottoman authorities and
merchants kept a close eye on the events. In the months before the battle they
demanded redress from the Venetians for the losses incurred as a result of
earlier Spanish attacks. The sultan sent an envoy to Venice, which he held
responsible for failing to protect the Adriatic.102 After the battle, diplomatic
dispatches show that the Ragusan and Venetian envoys engaged in fierce
discussions in Istanbul. The former, subjects of the sultan, complained of
1. Interior side of an inlaid cabinet dating to 1619 showing the Adriatic Sea surrounded by
cameos of kings of Spain and Naples; the external face shows a map of the globe. The cabinet,
produced in the circles of the Viceroy of Naples, was part of a series and is now held at the
Certosa e Museo di San Martino. By kind permission of the Ministero per i beni e le attivita`
culturali, Polo Museale della Campania.
102See Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic’, in E.
Zachariadou (ed.), The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain (Rethymnon,
2002), 357–70; based on Maria Pia Pedani, I documenti turchi dell’Archivio di Stato di
Venezia (Rome, 1994), 317–25; and Stephen Ortega, Negotiating Transcultural Relations
in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Ottoman–Venetian Encounters (Farnham, 2014),
135–63.
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Venetian incursions at Santa Croce and sought the protection of their over-
lord. The Venetian bailo or ambassador used the news to demonstrate
Venice’s determination to protect Ottoman merchants, and pointed the
finger at the Ragusans who had invited and guided the Spanish in the first
place.103 Later he encouraged the Ottomans to dispatch a large fleet in the
Mediterranean, evidently hoping to divert the Spanish. The Kapudan pasha,
or admiral of the sea, suggested a joint operation to trap the Spanish from
north and south and, interestingly, asked the bailo to divulge information
about Spanish movements so as to convince other Ottoman ministers.104
Meanwhile, in Italy and Spain, intelligence about a possible Ottoman–
Venetian alliance echoed in the secret dispatches of ambassadors and in
newsletters which turned it into anti-Venetian news.105
Turning back to the Adriatic, we see information exhange across borders
and beyond the level of the authorities. Venetian governors in Dalmatia in-
formed their neighbouring Ottoman counterparts about Spanish maritime
movements.106 Worrying that growing hostilities at sea had for months dis-
couraged overland convoys from Istanbul, the governor of Split said that
news of the battle would bring ‘trust and consolation’ to the ‘Turks of
Bosnia’ and show that Venice was serious against the Spanish.107
Documents collected by the Venetians show that a range of Ottoman subjects
were concerned about the news. In mid December, unnamed merchants who
in the Italian translation of their petition defined themselves as Turkish and
Muslim (‘noi mercanti Turchi . . . Mussulmani’) asked the doge for escorts
going to Venice from the island of Olib, midway between Zadar and Istria.
Rather than legal claims after the facts (of the kind merchants made in
Istanbul), this request for immediate inter-religious assistance shows aware-
ness of a fluid situation of war.108 On the day of the battle, the inhabitants of
Herceg Novi — competitors of nearby Ragusa and victims of Spanish raids in
the past — sent armed squads to the coast at Santa Croce. They arrived too
late, but their aga wrote to the Venetian governor of neighbouring Cattaro/
Kotor — with which they had long had economic relations — to offer help for
103ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Ambasciatori, Costantinopoli, file 84, fos. 254v–256v, 26 Dec. 1617;
and 269v, 10 Jan. 1618.
104Ibid., fos. 357r–358v, 24 Feb. 1618.
105Ortega, Negotiating, 161; and BAV, Urb. Lat. 1086, 91v, avviso of 20 Mar. 1618.
106ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Dalmazia, file 17, Dispatches of 16 Oct. 1617 (from
Trogir), 20 Nov. and 22 Nov. 1617 (from Split), and 23 Nov. 1617 (from Kotor).
107Ibid., Dispatch of 14 Dec. 1617 and, for the convoys, 5 Jan. 1618.
108Ibid., Undated, sent with letter from Olib of 12 Dec. 1617.
202 PAST AND PRESENT SUPPLEMENT 14
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/242/Supplem
ent_14/179/5637705 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 08 January 2020
the future.109 In the following days they drew up an arz or petition to the
sultan against the Ragusans, for treacherously enabling Spanish incursions on
their territories. According to the document, the Venetians protected ‘the
routes of the Grand Signor’ and prevented Spanish attacks on Ottoman
lands.110 In mid December, two informers from Herceg Novi who signed
themselves ‘Xasan Chiexaia’ and ‘Xusain Chapilia’ wrote to the Venetian
governor of Cattaro to report that the Ragusans were spreading anti-
Venetian news backed by a letter written aboard the Spanish navy.111 This
shows, first, that even in the absence of printed periodicals, orality and written
reports combined to put forward competing news in Muslim towns just as
they did in Christian ones; and secondly, that Hassan and Hussayn were
reaching beyond boundaries that made even a short distance such as that
between Cattaro and Herceg Novi a religious and political chasm. A macro-
history of information would miss both points.
People: mixed reactions
Manuscript and printed media carried information far, but in each place the
news solicited mostly oral responses at different social levels. We can glimpse
some through the microhistorical combination of a variety of sources. In
Venice we know about the news’ reception thanks to the Inquisitors of
State, a magistracy who enquired about foreign spies and in the process re-
corded their interactions with locals.112 Their reports show that in 1617 the
city was full of rumours about Spanish movements in the Adriatic, as shops
and squares multiplied the repercussions of the news. An informer overheard
a conversation in the Rialto about Osuna preparing to launch an invasion.113
Some weeks later, another denounced a Sicilian for reading out pro-Spanish
newsletters in a tailor’s workshop.114 A busy harbour such as Naples would
have had equally rich oral exchanges. While we have no equivalent of the
Venetian records, we know that the Venetian agent there had informers from
a wide social spectrum: shipwrights in the arsenal, sailors aboard the fleet, a
monk on an island off the Apulian coast, an instrumentalist in the viceroyal
109Ibid., Letter of the governor of Kotor of 23 Nov. 1617 enclosing the translation of an
undated letter by the ‘aga and capi’ of Herceg Novi.
110The original arz was sent from Kotor on 5 Dec. 1617 and translated in Venice on receipt.
The bailo in Istanbul used it in dealing with Ottoman ministers there. ASV, Senato,
Dispacci, Ambasciatori, Costantinopoli, file 84, fos. 289v–290r, 27 Jan. 1618.
111ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Dalmazia, file 17, Letter of 12 Dec. 1617.
112De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, 86–119.
113ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, box 1213, file 40, Report dated 26 Aug. 1617.
114ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, box 1213, file 37, Deposition of 8 Feb. 1618.
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palace and a servant of Osuna’s secretary.115 The diarist Francesco Zazzera, a
devoted subject of the king of Spain but a critic of Osuna, described the battle
as a Spanish victory but supplied contrasting details, mentioning heavy
Spanish losses, and also recording rumours of impending Venetian attacks;
(he also criticized the handling of Osuna’s celebrations).116 In the Adriatic
itself, the Venetian governor of Curzola interrogated a range of figures
who clearly had the means of knowing about maritime hostilities that
might have spelled their life or death, including a shipowner, two captains
and an oarsman.117
These sources reveal a range of reactions. A few days after the first reports
reached Venice, the Inquisitors investigated a brawl in an apothecary shop: a
merchant and a goldsmith came to blows with a news-writer who claimed
that the Neapolitans sank most of Venice’s galleys and mocked the Venetians
as braghessoni — a dialect reference to the Commedia dell’arte character
Pantalone, the old and impotent fool, often dressed as a patrician. Those
present included the apothecary, a violin player, a tooth-surgeon, a hat-
maker, several lawyers, and others whose profession was so lowly that it
escaped notice.118 A few weeks later, some Dominican friars fell out in the
convent of San Giovanni e Paolo. One disparaged the Venetians, ‘these little
lords’ (questi signoretti) who had a large navy but no soldiers and so no
dominion of the Adriatic: they ‘were wrong to wage war, and now [the
king of Spain] will show them’. ‘But if the Venetians are not lords of the
sea, why did Osuna not come earlier?’, one of the brethren responded. The
witnesses declared that the pro-Spanish friar enjoyed showing off his ‘know-
ledge of the world’ and for this reason used to subscribe to newsletters — but
he now saved money by reading other people’s copies ‘in the shops’. He
picked the news he preferred: born in Bergamo but educated in Milan, he
‘is more Spanish than Venetian, and in reading the newsletters he skips over
things that are good for the Republic, and if there is something for the
Spanish, he enjoys it and reports it during our conversations by the fire
115ASV, Capi del Consiglio di Dieci, Dispacci ambasciatori e residenti, box 19, 3 Oct. 1617;
and, misfiled in CX, Deliberazioni secrete, file 29, 26 Dec. 1617.
116Francesco Zazzera, ‘Giornali’, BL, Add. MS 8688, fos. 84r–85v and 88r, partially published
in Archivio storico italiano, ix (1846).
117ASV, Senato, Dispacci, Rettori, Dalmazia, file 17, Interrogations of 20 Nov. and 24 Nov.
1617.
118ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, box 1213, file 31, 11 Dec. 1617, Enquiry on news-writer
Vincenzo Tucci.
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after supper’.119 Orality could be directed to large publics too. In December
the authorities expelled a Capuchin friar who attacked Sarpi from the pulpit
and preached that the dominion of the sea belonged to God alone.120
If some people had a partisan attitude to the news, others were more scep-
tical. An example comes from the diary of a Venetian physician. He dwelt on
the battle, transcribed the printed newsbook by ‘capitan Alfonso’ and another
letter from the fleet. He believed the Venetians won and reported Spanish
casualties at a staggering 1600. But he also added negative information that
he clearly obtained elsewhere, including details of the officers’ mutiny, and
praised Spanish military discipline as better than Venetian.121 However, he
disbelieved Spanish boasts and described the duke of Osuna as gran ciurma-
dore : a charlatan who ‘talks in the same way as the Spanish captain acting in the
commedia, and says that he will conquer Venice and, what’s more, that he will
do so in no time at all’.122 Thus he too commented on the news with everyday
language drawn from street life. Charlatans acted to peddle their medicines,
and the word ciurmeria meant effective lying, ‘winding someone up in words’
(avvolgimento di parole): equivalent to the Latin circuitio and a literal pre-
modern version of ‘spin’.123 For its part, the Spanish captain or Capitano
spagnolo was a stock character in Commedia dell’arte : vain and arrogant, his
bragging bravado was as preposterous as it was laughable. The two expressions
meshed in spagnolata, a synonym for empty boast that the diarist annotated in
the margin to sum up his point.124 Such common metaphors offered people
tools to analyse information, to equate manipulation with a mask, and then to
unmask it through ridicule.
This language travelled in both space and time. Perhaps conveyed by com-
panies of actors, who criss-crossed Europe just like the news did, the same
images returned in a description of the battle contained in the manuscript
memoirs written years later by a Spanish travelling soldier who had served in
Osuna’s service, Diego Duque de Estrada. Having fought in the battle, he
119ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, box 1213, file 43, 7 Jan.–14 Jan. 1618, Enquiry on Fra Michele da
Urgnano.
120ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni secrete Roma, file 6, 29 Dec. 1617; and ASV, Roma ordinaria,
file 40, 30 Dec. 1617; the news was reported by the Spanish ambassador on 4 Feb. 1618:
Archivo General, Simancas, Estado, 1930, n. 5. The friar, Giacinto da Casale (1575–1627),
went on to play an important role in negotiations during the Thirty Years War, see A.
Koller, ‘Natta, Giacinto’, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiano.
121Giancarlo Sivos, ‘Cronaca’, in Biblioteca Marciana, Venice, Cod. Ital. VII.122 (8863), fos.
85r–88v, 84v.
122Ibid., fo. 39v.
123Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca (Venice, 1612).
124Biblioteca Marciana, Venice, Cod. Ital. VII.122 (8863), fo. 39v, marginal note.
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described it in a hilarious vignette, adding precise data favourable to Spain.
He recounted how the sailors shouted as the fleets manoeuvred close at night:
They told us in their language ‘Ponentine thieves! What do you
want of our gulf? Just wait till daybreak! We’ll shake the dust off
you so that your king, poor little Philip, whom you so proudly carry
on [or inside] you, comes crashing to the ground’. And we replied:
‘Levantine thieves! We’ll make you take off your slippers and run
even if you’re not on land, you liver-eating pantaloons!’125
Thus the battle turned into a matter for laughter thanks to a mixture of
picaresque exaggeration, multi-linguistic mockery and semi-scatological in-
sults. Filipeto could refer to medals carrying the emblem of the king shaken off
the soldiers’ uniforms, or to coins farted off their bodies, and the Venetians
are satirized for their dietary habits and (again) compared to the stock char-
acter of the slipper-wearing pantaloon.
The same images returned over time, with significant twists. In a biography
of Osuna written at the end of the century in Italian and soon translated into
French and Dutch, Gregorio Leti — Protestant exile, prolific author, and
news-writer — described the duke as a buffoonish capitan spagnolo who
had enjoyed acting in his youth.126 According to Leti, Osuna hoped his bra-
vado would inspire fear in his enemies and in the people. But the point could
be reversed, as Leti explained in a more general text on the use and effects of
periodicals, written in 1666: ‘Everyone knows that princes turn defeats into
victories in order to spare the people from fear and bring it into greater
affection: and so the people, so often deceived, always turns victories into
defeats, forming squadrons at its pleasure and princes to its tastes’.127 Writing
after the experience of the Fronde, the revolts of Naples and Catalonia, and
125‘Que quere´is de nuestro golfo? dejad llegar el dı`a, que os sacudiremos el polvo de manera
que os caiga el Filipeto de vuestro Rey, que trae´is en el cuerpo’; ‘Ladrones levantinos!
nosotros os haremos quitar los pantuflos y correr, aunque no este´is en tierra, pantalones
come-hı´gado’. Diego Duque de Estrada, Comentarios del desengan˜ado de sı´ mismo: Vida
del mismo autor, ed. Henry Ettinghausen (Madrid, 1982), 243, and on the dating and
sources of the text, 42–3. I am grateful to Henry Ettinghausen and to Antonio Castillo
Gomez for helping with the translation of this text. On Spanish soldiers’ autobiographical
writing, see Miguel Martı´nez, Front Lines: Soldier’s Writing in the Early Modern Hispanic
World (Philadelphia, 2016). The Spanish abbreviation of Felipe would be Felipito, so this
version might be Duque’s rendering — witting or unwitting — of the Italian assonance
with peto, a fart.
126Gregorio Leti, Vita di don Pietro Giron duca d’Ossuna vicere` di Napoli e di Sicilia sotto il
regno di Filippo III (Amsterdam, 1699), i, 317–19.
127Leti, Dialoghi politici (Geneva, 1666), 260.
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the English civil war, this expert practitioner of the information world
knew that rulers may well spin the news, but subjects spin it back with
unforeseen consequences.
III
Following a piece of news through different archives has shown how an in-
conclusive battle echoed across three empires and further afield, in famous
information hubs and also in areas where we still know little about the cir-
culation of news, and among not just political insiders and professionals but
also outsiders and ordinary people. The Mediterranean crossroads region,
until recently neglected in the history of information, was criss-crossed by a
variety of both old and new means of communication cutting through reli-
gious, political and linguistic borders.128 Close attention to sources suggests
that we need to rethink our understanding of the very nature of information.
The news did not travel unchanged, but grew and altered as it moved. On the
one hand, as it crossed borders, each crossing provoked further transform-
ations because the news served rival political projects — Venice’s sovereignty
of the sea, Spain’s leadership in Catholic Europe, Ragusa’s survival between
Ottomans and Spanish. On the other, transformations occurred simultan-
eously also inside states and empires, where each harbour, town or capital
acted as a multifaceted mirror, refracting and distorting the news because
competing actors circulated contradictory reports side by side. The author-
ities tried to control knowledge of the events through censorship and official
statements; powerful individuals manipulated accounts for their factional or
personal ends; professional news-writers, publishers and intelligencers
turned information into a tool of trade or patron–client relations; while or-
dinary people, in Venetian shops or Bosnian merchant convoys, were ready to
comment on the news and discern personal implications in what they read or
heard. Some people took sides, others displayed a scepticism that recurred
across boundaries and used similar metaphors of unmasking and ridicule
for news they knew was fake. Instead of a linear diffusion of information,
microhistory reveals three-dimensional ramifications across both space and
social scale.
Not every ramification can be captured. It is important to recognize that
even the most detailed microhistory has its limits, but these have to do less
with geographical size (as is commonly thought) than with the sources
128For recent considerations see Petitjean, L’Intelligence des choses; Corey Tazzara, The Free
Port of Livorno and the Transformation of the Mediterranean World (Oxford, 2017); and
Erin Maglaque, ‘The Literary Culture of the Venetian Mediterranean’, Italian Studies,
lxxiii (2018).
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themselves.129 While Giovanni Levi systematically read all sources relating to
the small town of Santena, he knew that only part had been preserved since
the seventeenth century.130 The archives for global history obviously magnify
this problem. I have only been able to study Ottoman reactions to the 1617
news through scattered published translations or indirectly from Venetian
sources. Greater collaboration among historians with different languages will
be crucial in the future, and one hopes that research funding will help achieve
this goal — starting with a comparative survey of the sources and documen-
tary genres that may make this enterprise even thinkable. But some aspects
escape most archives, in whatever language. One is the role of women. I found
no record relating to the 1617 battle that mentions information exchanged by
women — though we saw that the idea inspired a pamphleteer’s fiction about
a witch pretending to be a man, a sneer perhaps mixed with anxiety at gender
reversals. All we know is that Venetian women read newsletters and listened
to men reading them, and that moles on the Spanish fleet were paid via their
wives in Naples, who certainly had news about the battle.131
Other lacunae may have to do with self-censorship, for example due to
religion. We know that in Florence in the 1610s the Druze leader in exile
Fakhr al-Din followed the news while planning a rebellion back in Lebanon.
He spent the winter of 1617–18 as a guest of the duke of Osuna in a palace
overlooking the harbour of Naples, and he took part in some of the viceroy’s
ceremonies.132 He must have heard about the battle. But there seems to be a
gap in the archives once he moved to Naples, and he recorded no news in the
biography he part-dictated to a Muslim jurist years later, possibly because he
wanted to distance himself from Christian politics.133 Further microhistori-
cal study may reveal more leads and possibilities, but we need to accept that
even a rich combination of diverse sources will only ever reveal part of reality.
What is the broader significance of this case study? The inconclusiveness of
the 1617 battle and its location on a contested borderland facilitated the
proliferation of contrasting accounts. But this is far from exceptional — in
129On the awareness of the limitations of sources, see Trivellato, ‘Is There a Future’.
130Levi, Inheriting Power.
131Misfiled in ASV, CX, Deliberazioni secrete, file 29, 26 Dec. 1617; and see also de Vivo,
Information and Communication in Venice, 114–17.
132The documents are in Paolo Carali (ed.), Fakhr ad-Din II principe del Libano e la corte di
toscana, 1605–1635: Studi e documenti (Rome, 1936), 2 vols.
133The memoirs in Carali, ‘Soggiorno di Fakhr ad-Din II al-Ma’ni in Toscana, Sicilia e
Napoli e la sua visita a Malta (1613–1618)’, Annali del R. Istituto Superiore Orientale di
Napoli, viii (1936). On Fakhr and his biography, see also Nabil Matar, Europe Through
Arab Eyes, 1578-1727 (New York, 2009), 80–93.
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fact it is largely unexceptional. Many battles prompted incredulity and dis-
agreements about the sequence of actions or the numbers of casualties.134
Even in the face of resounding defeats, combatants tried to claim victory for
weeks after the event: during the Italian Wars, after Lepanto, in the Thirty
Years War, close attention reveals that clear outcomes often emerged slowly
and were at first obfuscated by contradictory accounts that fuelled uncer-
tainty and scepticism.135 The point is not to suggest a history of global in-
formation one news story at a time.136 All events are to a large degree
exceptions — indeed, this has long been the core of social historians’ criticism
of histoire e´ve´nementielle. Microhistorians endorse that criticism — but go
on to use exceptions to reveal broader phenomena. The gist of Edoardo
Grendi’s notion of ‘normal exception’ rests in sources: deviant behaviour
prompts outstanding record-making, and the records can then be used to
reconstruct both deviance and the norm.137 So, what does our unexceptional
exception reveal?
One way of answering is to compare the processes analysed here to the
prevalent mechanisms for the circulation of information at the time. As it
turns out, the notion of transformational movement captures, much better
than the diffusionist model of traditional media history, the normal func-
tioning of the principal media of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Manuscript newsletters and printed gazettes were the products of profes-
sionals situated at nodal points along postal routes, who collaborated with
postmasters, innkeepers (both men and women) and stable boys to collect
information from other newsletters produced at other points; they selected
faraway information and enriched it with local news gathered through con-
versation or direct observation; and their compilations then reached other
professionals who further transformed the news while reporting it. Such
134Ottavia Niccoli, ‘The Kings of the Dead on the Battlefield of Agnadello’, in Edward Muir
and Guido Ruggiero, (eds.), Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe (Baltimore,
1991); and John Gagne´, ‘Counting the Dead: Traditions of Enumeration and the
Italian Wars’, Renaissance Quarterly, lxvii (2014), 791–840.
135Massimo Rospocher, Il papa guerriero: Giulio II nello spazio pubblico europeo (Bologna,
2015); Florence Alazard, La Bataille oublie´e: Agnadel, 1509, Louis XII contre les Ve´nitiens
(Rennes, 2017); Stefan Hanss, Lepanto als Ereignis: Dezentrierende Geschichte(n) der
Seeschlacht von Lepanto (1571) (Go¨ttingen, 2017). Lepanto itself was initially seen as
unclear, and the same can be said of countless battles during the Thirty Years War, see
now Filippo de Vivo and Maria Antonietta Visceglia, ‘La guerra dei Trent’Anni e l’infor-
mazione’, special issue of Rivista storica italiana, cxxx (2018).
136To paraphrase Tonio Andrade: ‘A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord:
Toward a Global Microhistory’, Journal of World History, xxi (2010), 591.
137Edoardo Grendi, ‘Micro-analisi e storia sociale’, Quaderni storici, xxxv (1977).
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located intermediaries were crucial to long-distance communication.
Information covered large distances through shorter journeys, and it changed
as it moved. An analogy can be made with navigation. When possible, ships
avoided long crossings and instead stopped in successive ports to embark
food and sell small amounts of goods. Just as their cargo changed along sea
routes, so newsletters were re-elaborated at every step of the way. This literally
shaped the media, since manuscript and printed periodicals were organized
into paragraphs preceded by headings indicating the origin of the news (not
the location of the original event.) Successive newswriters repeated some
paragraphs, dropped others, and added yet more — and it is interesting
that the eighteenth-century press maintained this basic arrangement.138
Most media theorists see writing and printing as primarily functional to
‘fixing’ messages.139 But in fact, what is striking about the early modern
media is how much flexibility they enabled. Before telegraphy and the
steam press, the specificity of information was its mixed nature, at once
located and in movement.140
The mixed contribution of local and distant knowledge vehicled in the
prevalent media at the time had its visual counterpart, for example on the
title pages of many early printed periodicals. Some displayed the flying
Mercury, others foot-travellers or couriers, and the backgrounds included
both medium-sized walled towns and faraway horizons. In early modern
maps, specific places were inscribed into large regions and world-spaces.
The ivory chart of the Kingdom of Naples and the Adriatic reproduced in
Plate 1 was inlaid in a cabinet whose drawers were decorated with views of
famous cities of the Spanish empire and the Mediterranean and whose open-
ing table also showed a map of the world.141 This later map is another typical
example, which displays the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and part of the Red
Sea, all surrounded by cameo bird’s-eye views of harbour-cities on African,
Asian and European coasts.142 Often including information about cities’ or
138Will Slauter, ‘The Paragraph as Information Technology: How News Traveled in the
Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World’, Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales, lxvii (2012).
139This is true of even admirable works combining sociology with history such as John B.
Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Cambridge, 1995).
On fixing, see Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word
(London and New York, 1982).
140For an interesting take on ‘crosslocations’ see the ongoing project5https://www.helsinki.
fi/en/researchgroups/crosslocations4(accessed 18 June 2019).
141See Plate 1, above, p. 201.
142This had an obvious precedent in Georg Braun’s Civitates orbis terrarum, which functions
as a complement to Ortelius’ atlas. For more information on this combination see Hilary
Ballon and David Friedman, ‘Portraying the City in Early Modern Europe: Measurement,
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regions’ clothing and information centres, this was a common representation
at the time, combining the local and the global perhaps more readily than
some historians are prepared to do today (see Plate 2).
Further research will extend the comparison of practices, channels, habits
and techniques.143 In many places around and beyond the early modern
Mediterranean — in Italy, France, the Ottoman Empire or Persia — infor-
mation had a dual nature, combining the exogenous and the endogenous,
because news brought in from the outside was reworked by locals on the basis
of their own concerns.144 In every place I know of, people needed local know-
ledge to find distant news. Just as in Venice gossips and news-writers picked
up the news in the Rialto, so in Rome they did in the Banchi area; in London
they had St Paul’s Walk; in Istanbul, gardens at the back of embassies; barber-
shops in Damascus, or coffee houses and travel lodges in Isfahan.145
Comparisons will show more analogies and differences, as a new and rich
global history of information is written through microhistories of exchanges
at once closely embedded in their local context and connecting faraway
places. The same applies to the history of science and material culture.146
As with commodities, luxury goods and scientific ideas, so with information,
Representation, and Planning’, in David Woodward (ed.), The History of Cartography, iii
(Chicago, 2007).
143Jeroen Duindam and Zolta´n Biedermann each also insist on different views of the rela-
tionship between the local and the global, see Duindam, ‘A Plea for Global Comparison:
Redefining Dynasty; and Biedermann, ‘Three Ways of Locating the Global:
Microhistorical Challenges in the Study of Early Transcontinental Diplomacy, both in
this volume.
144Miche`le Fogel, Les Ce´re´monies de l’information dans la France du XVI e au milieu du
XVIII e sie`cle (Paris, 1989); Babak Rahimi, Theater State and the Formation of Early
Modern Public Sphere in Iran: Studies on Safavid Muharram Rituals, 1590–1641 CE
(Leiden, 2012); Helen Pfeifer, ‘Encounter after the Conquest: Literary Salons in
Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Damascus’, International Journal of Middle East Studies
(2015).
145See respectively Filippo de Vivo, ‘La farmacia come luogo di cultura: le spezierie di
medicina in Italia’, in Maria Conforti, Andrea Carlino and Antonio Clericuzio (eds.),
Interpretare e curare: medicina e salute nel Rinascimento (Rome, 2013), 129–42; John-Paul
Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities (Oxford, 2013), 82, 114, 141; Eugene Rogan, The Arabs:
A History (London, 2009), 48; Kathryn Babayan, Mystics Monarchs and Messiahs:
Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), 442–3; Rudi
Matthee, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500–1900
(Princeton, 2005), 165–72; Dana Sajdi, The Barber of Damascus: Nouveau Literacy in the
Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Levant (Stanford, 2013).
146See p. 181 above.
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we need to recognize that in the early modern world, the global and the local
were inextricable.
I want to end with a final reason why all this matters. The early modern
plurality of comunication activities of the kind explored in this article gave
way in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the emergence of mass
media. Today digital social media have once again given strength to dispersed
information pluralism — while they have also created new, subtle channels
for propaganda.147 By stressing agency and uncovering manipulation, the
kind of microhistory I have explored in this article is better suited than the
one-way, top-down histories of the media that arose in the twentieth century,
not just to account for the past but to engage with some of the key questions of
the present. First, as we move back to the future, we need to remember that
pluralism is always a precarious good, undermined by trolls, bots, deep fakes
and targeted ads. Information is and was unstable and continuously con-
structed, but this does not mean that all news is fake news: on the contrary,
this article has shown the subtle ways in which opposite agents manipulated
reports to turn an inconclusive event into a powerful message. The micro-
history of information helps us understand the consolidation of news into
‘facts’ at the time and later. Moving from synchronic to diachronic, rival
nationalist histories turned information into national traditions precisely
by treating spurious reports as reliable sources.148 Secondly, by considering
a large variety of sources beyond periodicals, social and cultural history can
help us answer the question of how messages go viral. Reflecting on his ex-
perience of the trenches in World War I, Marc Bloch explained fake news in
terms of the lack of reliable information; later, in the Royal Touch and in his
enthusiastic response to Georges Lefebvre’s Great Fear, a 1932 study of the
massive rumour that engulfed France in the wake of the Revolution, he
described fake news as evidence not of fact, but of collective mentality; and
then, during another disastrous war, he elaborated it into a broader point of
147John Oddo, The Discourse of Propaganda: Case Studies from the Persian Gulf War and the
War on Terror (University Park, Pa., 2018).
148As with rival histories that claim a victory in 1617 on the basis of misinterpreted evidence
such as the newsbooks printed in Venice and Spain: Cesareo Ferna´ndez Duro, El gran
duque de Osuna y su marina: Jornadas contra turcos y venecianos (1602–1624) (Madrid,
1885), 100–8; and Mocenigo, Storia della marina veneziana, 97–112. In dissecting these
constructions, I see a parallel between microhistory and the study of tradition as practised
by philologists such as Sebastiano Timpanaro and Franco Contini, see Timpanaro, The
Genesis of Lachmann’s Method (Chicago, 2005, first pubd 1960); and Contini, Varianti e
altra linguistica (Turin, 1997). I am indebted to Carlo Ginzburg for this point.
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source criticism.149 Finally, then, today we can derive wisdom from the fact
that the seventeenth century already developed a whole vocabulary and in-
tellectual armoury to denounce and ridicule spin. Thus, the microhistory of
information can help us understand conflicting constructions: not to con-
clude that it’s all a fabrication, but to understand how fabricating worked,
how some people contributed and how others saw through it.
Birkbeck, University of London Filippo de Vivo
149Marc Bloch, L’Histoire, la Guerre, la Re´sistance (Paris, 2006), 117–67 (1914–15), 293–316
(1921), and 928–30 (1941–43); see also Jacques Revel’s introduction to Georges Lefebvre,
La grande peur de 1789: Suivi de les foules re´volutionnaires (Paris, 1988), 7–23.
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